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Prioritising African Perspectives in Psychiatric Genomics Research: Issues of 




Psychiatric genomics research with African populations comes with a range of practical 
challenges around translation of psychiatric genomics research concepts, procedures, and 
nosology. These challenges raise deep ethical issues particularly around legitimacy of 
informed consent, a core foundation of research ethics. Through a consideration of the 
constitutive function of language, the paper problematises like-for-like, designative 
translations which often involve the ‘indigenization’ of English terms or use of metaphors 
which misrepresent the risks and benefits of research. This paper argues that effective 
translation of psychiatric genomics research terminology in African contexts demands 
substantive engagement with African conceptual schemas and values. In developing 
attenuated forms of translational thinking, researchers may recognise the deeper motivational 
reasons behind participation in research, highlighting the possibility that such reasons may 
depart from the original meaning implied within informed consent forms.  These translational 
issues might be ameliorated with a critical re-examination of how researchers develop and 
present protocols to institutional ethics review boards.    
 





The language used in psychiatric genomics research tools currently draws mainly 
from Western conceptualisations of psychiatric constructs and explanatory tools developed 
by and for English-speaking European populations. The valuable contribution that African 
populations can make in advancing the science of psychiatric genomics has resulted in wide-
spread interest in sampling from the African continent.1 With this comes a range of practical 
challenges around the development of scientific discourses about psychiatric genomics in 
local African languages, such as the absence of linguistically equivalent vocabulary for 
                                                     
1 Campbell MC, Tishkoff SA. (2008) African genetic diversity: implications for human demographic history, 
modern human origins, and complex disease mapping. Annual Review of Genomics and Human Genetics. 
2008(9), 403-33.  
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psychiatric terminology (e.g.: schizophrenia)2 as well as genomic concepts (e.g.: genes, 
DNA) and associated research practices3, forcing researchers in these contexts to develop 
innovative discourses to support the explanation of these terms.  One potential advantage of 
this process is that it encourages broader engagement with African participants in the 
refinement of these scientific discourses. 
Yet these practical challenges reveal deeper issues at stake around the linguistic and 
conceptual translation of genomics discourse in the African context. This paper focusses on 
the central question of how practical and ethical issues of translation may be addressed to 
accurately and meaningfully facilitate participants towards informed consent, the most basic 
ethical principle on which all other principles are founded.  An important ethical concern is 
that translated descriptions can be broad and vague, potentially open to misinterpretation – 
not only misrepresenting the risks and benefits of participating in this type of research study, 
but also reflecting superficial or poor engagement with the value frameworks and 
perspectives which are deeply embedded within different African cultures.  
The tendency to overlook African value and conceptual frameworks is especially 
problematic given the fact that biogenetic explanations of psychiatric conditions are often 
only one of the explanatory illness models used by African participants.4  Indeed, others 
include religious and traditional spiritual explanations (see for example how these religious 
and traditional spiritual explanations influence the content of psychotic delusions in Southern 
African samples.5 These explanatory models may lead to participants’ resistance to provide 
                                                     
2 Campbell, M. M., Susser, E., de Vries, J., Baldinger, A., Sibeko, G., Mndini, M. M., ... & Stein, D. J. (2015). 
Exploring researchers’ experiences of working with a researcher-driven, population-specific community 
advisory board in a South African schizophrenia genomics study. BMC medical ethics, 16(1), 45. 
3 De Vries, J., Bull, S. J., Doumbo, O., Ibrahim, M., Mercereau-Puijalon, O., Kwiatkowski, D., & Parker, M. 
(2011). Ethical issues in human genomics research in developing countries. BMC medical ethics, 12(1), 5. 
4 Kong, Camillia.  (2019). Cultural Translation, Human Meaning, and Genes: Why Interpretation Matters in 
Psychiatric Genomics’.  In Y. A. Frimpong-Mansoh and C. A. Atuire, Bioethics in Africa: Theories and Praxis 
(Eds.) 95-112.  Wilmington: Vernon Press. 
5 Campbell, M. M., Sibeko, G., Mall, S., Baldinger, A., Nagdee, M., Susser, E., & Stein, D. J. (2017). The 
content of delusions in a sample of South African Xhosa people with schizophrenia. BMC psychiatry, 17(1), 41; 
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their blood and saliva samples – the principal mode of sample collection in genomics 
research – particularly in instances where the use of these biological samples is not clearly 
defined. 
 This paper argues that efforts to translate concepts around psychiatric genomics for 
research purposes in African contexts demand substantive engagement with African 
conceptual schemas and values.  The absence of linguistic equivalents around genetic 
scientific terminology, descriptions of scientific procedures used in genomics studies, and 
psychiatric nosology present significant challenges.  Whilst the temptation may be to deploy 
‘like-for-like’ translation of terms, such an approach ignores the deeper constitutive function 
of language, in as much as language expresses the interpretative reality, substantive practices, 
and conceptual schemas of a people.6  Issues of translation are by no means isolated to 
psychiatric genomics studies, however, the content and foci of such studies uniquely rely on 
presuppositions around the fundamental ontology of human minds and behaviour – the latter 
of which are frequently substantively and culturally laden concepts.  Thus, the 
interpenetration between language and cultural worldview are all the more explicit and acute, 
making attempts to translate or indeed, construct relevant genomic terms without deep 
understanding of the constitutive worldview of African cultures not only impractical, but 
ethically questionable for obtaining proper consent.  Yet, psychiatric genomics studies 
continue to be driven by an approach focused on linguistic equivalence despite efforts in 
other domains of clinical and indeed, psychiatric interventions, which have integrated 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Connell A, Koen L, Niehaus D, Cloete KJ, Jordaan E, Botha U. Religious Delusions in a Xhosa Schizophrenia 
Population. Journal of Religion and Health. 2015; 54(5):1555-62. 
Patel V. Explanatory models of mental illness in sub-Saharan Africa. Soc Sci Med. 1995; 40(9):1291–8. 
6 Hill, Jane H. & Mannheim, Bruce. (2003). Language and World View. Annual Review of Anthropology. 21. 
381-404. 10.1146/annurev.an.21.100192.002121; See also: Taylor, Charles.  (2016). The Language Animal.  




community-driven efforts to ensure that the translation of tools are appropriately attuned to 
the conceptual schemas of communities.7   
This narrow focus, however, does not limit the potential applicability of our analysis 
to other clinical studies, but distils an already largely recognised point about the significance 
of successful communication as necessary for informed consent, even by the lights of 
Western bioethical theories.8  Indeed, the ethical issues raised by the translational pitfalls 
encountered in psychiatric genomics studies is a pressing issue for Western scientific 
researchers, translators, and bioethicists, precisely because it in fact illustrates clearly a 
broad, cross-cultural consensus how miscommunication remains a major obstacle to 
obtaining informed consent.9  The challenge of translation therefore raises, not just practical 
consequences for psychiatric genomics studies, but also deeper ethical issues in clinical 
studies more generally. Most notable here are the incumbent responsibilities and obligations 
of scientific and clinical researchers to ensure translational efforts engage meaningfully with 
the conceptual schemas implied in the vocabulary – or absence of vocabulary – of clinical 
study concepts.  We cannot explore this generality in any depth, however gesture towards it 
so as to highlight the significance of our narrow focus on psychiatric genomics research.10 
 Section I outlines the constitutive rather than designative function of language, which 
explains the need for translators of psychiatric genomics studies, to engage substantively with 
the normative practices and conceptual framework of the community to which translation is 
made.  Section II then provides a broad overview of salient features of African belief, thought 
                                                     
7 For example, the highly successful work of The Friendship Bench in Zimbabwe: see 
https://www.friendshipbenchzimbabwe.org. 
8 Faden, Ruth R. and Tom L. Beauchamp.  (1985).  A History and Theory of Informed Consent.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986; also Bromwich, Danielle and Joseph Millum.  Disclosure and consent to medical 
participation,  Journal of Moral Philosophy.  12:2 2015): 195-219 and Bromwich, Danielle and Joseph R. 
Millum.  Informed consent to HIV cure research.  Journal of Medical Ethics 43:2 (2017): 108-113.   
9 Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing this point. 
10 We also set aside the competency requirements of informed consent as this detracts from the main focus of 
the paper.  For more on the problematisation of these requirements within psychiatric genomics studies, see 
Kong, Camillia, Mehret Efrem, and Megan Campbell.  (In Press).  Education vs Screening: The Use of Capacity 
to Consent Tools in Psychiatric Genomics.  Journal of Medical Ethics. 
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and practices which impact on African notions of mental health treatment and research.  It is 
against this background that practical and ethical challenges of translation in psychiatric 
genomics research are discussed in Sections III and IV. 
 
I. Language as constitutive 
 
Often, psychiatric genomics studies treat translational issues as a simple matter of 
finding the equivalent indigenous terms to describe putatively neutral ideas or phenomena. 
Approaches of adapting North American and European psychiatric assessment tools for 
different language and cultural contexts using forward and back-translation designs that focus 
exclusively on linguistic equivalence are examples here.  Materials are first translated into the 
target language by one translator then back-translated into the original language of the tool by 
another translator and the original and back-translated versions compared for consistency.  
However, this implies the questionable presumption that language has a purely designative 
rather than constitutive function.  In designative accounts of language, words and linguistic 
idioms are reduced to the designation of things – the usage of words or utterances to correlate 
to or describe features of our surroundings or behaviours.11 As such, language is thought of as 
‘an assemblage of separable instruments, which lie as it were transparently to hand, and 
which can be used to marshal ideas, this use being something we can fully control and 
oversee’12. According to such a designative account, the absence of relevant genomic terms 
in African cultures would be a relatively minor issue, redressed by the construction of signs 
that can be used instrumentally to convey scientific ideas like DNA.  
                                                     
11 Taylor, Charles.  (2016). The Language Animal.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.  Also Taylor, 
Charles.  (1995). The Importance of Herder.  In Philosphical Arguments (79-99) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press.  
12 Taylor, Charles.  (1995). The Importance of Herder.  In Philosphical Arguments (96) Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press  
6 
 
However, the challenges consistently reported in translation studies of psychiatric 
instruments from English into African languages suggest language has a markedly different, 
more constitutive function, particularly in interpreting and shaping peoples’ experiences of 
illness13.  For example while the English language supports a wide range of emotional 
experiences illustrated by the many emotive adjectives within the language, isiXhosa, an 
Nguni language prevalent in South Africa, has far fewer emotive adjectives and more easily 
accommodates somatic descriptions of distress.14 It stands to reason then that there is a 
difference in symptom presentation and the way in which psychological distress is described 
between these two language groups.  Language as such cannot be treated as an instrument to 
convey or describe neutral datum, but rather, is the intersubjectively constituted framework 
which allows individuals to interpret, understand, and express the meaning of their 
experiences and social bonds.15  Words only make sense in relation to the whole semantic 
field that expresses a web of values, social practices, and conceptual framework that 
constitute the worldview of different people.  In other words, language is vital in facilitating 
the interpretative reality, understanding, and expression of individuals through and within 
their social relations.  This means that ‘we can never in principle have a clear oversight of the 
implications of what we say at any moment’.16   
Importantly, this view of language does not mean new terminology within a culture is 
automatically invalid or inherently problematic.  But it does suggest that unique issues arise 
specific to the process of cross-cultural translation.  For example, English, like any language, 
is dynamic and consistently evolving.  The terminology of genomics is likewise relatively 
                                                     
13 Swartz, Leslie. (1998). Culture and mental health: A Southern African view. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, Southern Africa. 
14 Campbell, M. M., & Young, C. (2016). A Xhosa language translation of the CORE-OM using South African 
university student samples. Transcultural psychiatry, 53(5), 654-673. 
15 There is a great deal to be explored here around the designative vs constitutive traditions of language, but this 
would detract from the primary focus of our paper.  For a rich account of the philosophical background of these 
two traditions, see Taylor, Charles.  2016.  The Language Animal, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
16 Taylor, Charles. (1985). Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I. Charles Taylor, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 231. 
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recent, with terms like DNA and gene coming from the scientific lab and gradually 
incorporated into common linguistic usage.  This process of what we might call ‘culturally 
internal’ incorporation is distinct from that of cross-cultural translation for the following 
reason.  First, whilst genomic terms were new to English at some point, the semantic field 
and its constitutive values were not: the epistemological and ontological commitments 
embedded within genomics study were not wholly alien to the Western context but a 
reflecting a long tradition of a particular mode of scientific investigation.  By contrast, such 
genomics study, its constitutive presumptions and substantive meanings, are all relatively 
new and indeed, alien to different African contexts, representing a new reality in effect.17   
Attention to the constitutive nature of language is also important to illustrate precisely 
how translational issues within psychiatric genomics studies cannot be viewed simply as a 
straightforwardly linguistic issue, where there is an absence of appropriate linguistic terms.  
Language has a constitutive relation to cultural values, meaning that the absence of linguistic 
terms in itself could be indicative of culturally significant values which orient divergent ways 
of fundamentally understanding particular phenomena or experiences.  For example, one 
might argue that the absence the concept of ‘biological sample’ in African languages suggests 
a simple linguistic puzzle – what appears to be required is simply the need to either simply 
introduce a new term of usage, or indeed, find a roughly equivalent term.   However, the 
absence of ‘biological sample’ is itself an indication of how cultural value penetrates the 
linguistic domain: as we explore more fully below, the semantic field around the concept 
involves assumptions of taking blood or saliva, of the scientific rather than metaphysical 
meaning of these bodily fluids, of instrumentalising parts of one’s physical being.  This 
                                                     
17 Another example might be found in many indigenous communities across East African 
communities whereby the word ‘school’ was also a new term that is merely indigenized to become, 
for example in Kikuyu, ‘thukuru’. But by contrast, this translation is not problematic due to its 
physical representation and common interpretation across East African communities.  The intent of 
‘school’ tracks already existing substantive cultural commitments, such as to the education of 
children, fostering of community, and so on.   
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semantic field is notably different and often alien to different African contexts.  Only once 
the constitutive nature of language is taken as our starting point is it possible to devote 
critical attention to the ‘alienness’ of certain semantic fields, to the absences or presences of 
certain linguistic terms, in an attempt to forge the type of deeper understanding necessary for 
translation. 
This does not mean that all translational efforts should be abandoned (as we discuss 
later in the paper.  However, effective translation will involve recognising the intrinsic 
limitations of translation (i.e. that we cannot fully control the meanings that emerge) as well 
as of its open-ended nature (i.e. that translation is always an ongoing process).  But it will 
also demand substantive engagement with the ways in which people view and interact with 
their world, revealed through the ways in which people express and interpret themselves.  As 
Nida explains, words as ‘symbols for features of […] cultures’ suggests that ‘the person who 
is engaged in translating from one language into another ought to be constantly aware of the 
contrast in the entire range of culture represented by the two languages’.18   
 
II. Overview of common salient features of African thought and practice 
 
We have suggested thus far that effective translation demands a more holistic 
approach to language, where there is a need to interpretively engage with and understand the 
practices and conceptual schemas of a people.  This is vital in the case of health and 
especially mental health within African settings, not least if translations of psychiatric and 
genomic terms are to avoid distortion and improve local application in future.  Four 
particularly salient features of African thought and practice are outlined below: importantly, 
such is the interconnection of these features that it is difficult to discuss one without the 
                                                     




other.  It is only for purposes of simplicity and clarity that we discuss them separately here.  
Moreover, in pointing out these features, nowhere are we claiming that Africa is a 
homogenous unit: different cultural groups across Africa have different languages, and 
different cultural beliefs on the causes of ill health and therefore how healing may be 
achieved. Therefore, every time we give an example or illustration, we cite the specific 
communities that we are referring to and/or provide the source of the specific information. 
Nevertheless, certain broad understanding and explanations of health and healing are held in 
common across sub-Saharan Africa.  As Johnson (2010: 57) observes: ‘… in sub-Saharan 
black Africa the different cultures do share a consciousness of the world’.19  
i) Holistic view of illness  
First and foremost, the concept of health is firmly embedded within a holistic sense of 
the world and of persons.  The world is not divided into distinct, isolated parts and 
components, such as different spheres of life (i.e. the spiritual, physical, and social) or 
different individual selves.  Rather, these components are completely intertwined as a whole, 
both in a definitional and normative sense.  Health refers to, not simply physical health but 
also the psychological, emotional, spiritual, and socio-cultural well-being of individuals, their 
families, and their communities.20  The intersection of many factors is likewise understood to 
cause illness.  Supernatural, natural, and social causes co-exist in common explanations21: for 
example, mental illness may be understood as simultaneously socially- and spiritually-
caused, whereby the spiritual world inflicts illness onto an individual or group in response to 
                                                     
19 Johnson F.A. (2010). African Perspectives on Mental Disorder. In Mezzich J.E., Kastrup M.C., Honda Y. 
(Eds.), Psychiatric Diagnosis, 57. New York: Springer.  See also: Gyekye, Kwame. (1995). African 
philosophical thought: the Akan conceptual scheme. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  
20 Omonzejele PF. (2008). African Concepts of Health, Disease, and Treatment: An Ethical Inquiry. The Journal 
of Science and Healing. 4 (2): 120-126; Truter I. (2007). African traditional healers: cultural and religious 
beliefs intertwined in a holistic way. SA Pharmaceutical Journal. (2007), 56–60. 
21 Kahissay, M. H., Fenta, T. G., & Boon, H. (2017). Beliefs and perception of ill-health causation: a socio-
cultural qualitative study in rural North-Eastern Ethiopia. BMC Public Health, (17), 124. Retrieved March 10, 
2019, from http://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-017-4052-y  
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those perceived to be responsible for unhealthy social practices.22  Or mental illness could be 
caused because of the asocial sentiments and spiritual practices of others.  For example, in a 
sample of 200 South African Xhosa people with schizophrenia, over 70% (n=125) reported 
bewitchment to be the cause of their mental illness, inflected by family members, neighbours 
and community members because of jealously towards the patient.23    
Moreover, the ethical priority of the social good, particularly in rural settings, has 
some important implications for conceptualisations of intergenerational mental illness: poor 
family relationships or individual/group transgressions which harm the community are seen 
to trigger ill mental health in individual members of the family, within the same generation, 
or one or many generations later.24 Countering illness therefore demands understanding, not 
just a single cause, but attending to its connection to others, not least the social community 
and spirit world which is an integral part of the whole.25  
 
ii) Communitarianism  
Another prominent way in which holism is expressed in African thought is in the 
conceptualisation of human persons as situated within the community.  Contrary to the 
Western view of atomistic individuals who possess biological and psychological 
independence, African perspectives understand persons as integrated within a community, 
encompassing an intrinsic connection between biological, psychological, and particularly, 
social components.  This communitarian outlook contains both definitional and normative 
                                                     
22 Kyei, J.J., Dueck, A., Indart, M.J. and Nyarko, N.Y. (2014). Supernatural belief systems, mental health and 
perceptions of mental disorders in Ghana. International Journal of Culture and Mental Health, 7(2), 137-151. 
23 Campbell, Megan M., Goodman Sibeko, Sumaya Mall, Adam Baldinger, Mohamed Nagdee, Ezra Susser, and 
Dan J. Stein.  (2017a). The content of delusions in a sample of South African Xhosa people with 
schizophrenia. BMC Psychiatry. 17(1), 41.  
24 Aina, OF, and O Morakinyo. (2011). Culture–bound syndromes and the neglect of cultural factors in 
psychopathologies among Africans. African Journal of Psychiatry. (September 2011): 278-285; Aina, OF, and 
O Morakinyo. (2011). Culture–bound syndromes and the neglect of cultural factors in psychopathologies among 
Africans. African Journal of Psychiatry. (September 2011): 278-285. 
25 Amenga-Etego, Rose Mary. (2019). The Practice of Traditional Medicine and Bioethical Challenges.  In Y. 




dimensions:26 it is definitional in so far as individual identity cannot be defined apart from 
community.  Describing the ontological priority of the community in defining the self, Mbiti 
states: ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am’27.  In other words, the 
existence of the individual depends on the existence of community28 – a sentiment that 
informs the philosophical concept and practice of Ubuntu (Nussbaum 2003).   
The normative dimension of communitarianism is also reflected in the notion that the 
communal good is constitutive of the individual good, whereby the social norms of one’s 
community guide and constrain individual motivation and agency29.  The attainment of social 
status, conceived of as personhood, depends on the extent to which individuals have 
undergone rituals of incorporation, participate in social life, and fulfil requisite obligations as 
determined by one’s social role30.  African personhood thus represents a certain normative 
status that is acquired, not by mere birth, but over time, through the process of socialization 
and the fulfilment of social expectations within one’s community.  A common admonishment 
in rural Kenya, for example, is ‘Behave like a person and people will treat you like one’ – 
suggesting that the status of personhood is contingent on one’s incorporation into the social 
good and can also be lost through forms of asociality and relational disconnection31.  
 
iii) The African ethical community  
                                                     
26 See: Ikuenobe, P. (2006). Philosophical perspectives on communalism and morality in African traditions. 
Lexington Books. 
27 Mbiti, J.S. (1969). African Religions and Philosophy. Nairobi: Heinemann, 141. 
28 Menkiti I. (2017). Community, Communism, Communitarianism: An African Intervention. In: Afolayan A., 
Falola T. (Eds.) The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy. (461-473). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
29 Gyekye, Kwame. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. 
Oxford: OUP USA. 
30 Menkiti I. (2017). Community, Communism, Communitarianism: An African Intervention. In: Afolayan A., 
Falola T. (Eds.) The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy. (461-473). New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 
Presbey, G.M. (2002). Maasai concepts of personhood: the roles of recognition, community, and 
individuality. International Studies in Philosophy. 34(2), 57-82. 
31 Cf: Gyekye, Kwame. (2011). African Ethics. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Retrieved July 27 2018, from URL: http://plato.stanford.edu   
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Closely related to the holistic and communitarian outlook is the belief in and practice 
of the African ‘ethical community’.  Africans believe in the co-existence of and 
interrelationships between the supernatural and natural worlds, whereby both constitute an 
ethical community with humans at its centre.  Moreover, all existents in this community, 
including those that are supernatural, are thought to exercise real agency in the natural and 
human worlds32. 
The supernatural world is structured hierarchically and is comprised of an omniscient 
being, spirits, and ancestors.  The one all-powerful and all-knowing being created everything 
that exists, be it material or non-material, including spirits, human persons (both living and 
the living dead – otherwise called ancestors) animals, and all within the natural environment.  
Known by different names in different communities across the continent, the omniscient 
supernatural being is generally thought to support and maintain good health.  Personal and 
communal practices like rituals therefore have an important function in directly appealing to 
this being for the maintenance of good health33.  The loss of health may likewise be 
associated with the agency of the omniscient being, of whose intervention may heal and 
restore health.  
Supernatural spirits function as communicative intermediaries between humans and 
the omniscient being34.  Functioning as both good and evil forces, their agency transmits 
good and evil in the human world.   Good spirits are responsible for the maintenance of 
health and restoration of health, whilst some dis(eases), including mental illness, may result 
from the agency of evil spirits in response to unhealthy relationships among individuals or 
groups of individuals within the ethical community.  Appeasing the spirits through personal 
and communal practices like rituals help maintain or restore good health.  In addition, 
                                                     
32 Wiredu, K.  (1996). Cultural universals and particulars: An African perspective. Indiana: Indiana University 
Press. 
33 Omonzejele PF. (2008). African Concepts of Health, Disease, and Treatment: An Ethical Inquiry. The Journal 
of Science and Healing. 4 (2): 120-126. 
34 Omonzejele PF. Op. cit. Note 23. 
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ancestors who Mbiti 35 calls the ‘living dead’ are community members who have died but 
remain in the memory of the living.  Like spirits, ancestors can cause good or evil, with ill 
health, especially mental illness resulting from ancestors being angered or offended by the 
thoughts, actions, or speech of an individual person or entire community.  
Supernatural agency is not confined solely to spirits, ancestors, or an omniscient 
being, but manifests itself also through witchcraft and traditional healing.  Certain 
community members are thought to possess mystical and innate powers which manipulate 
natural forces to inflict harm on individual persons or groups through witchcraft36.  Where 
sorcerers and witches inflict mental illness on a fellow community member, a traditional 
healer would be deployed to counter the effect of witchcraft and bring about healing37.  
Depending on the diagnosis, different preventive and curative treatments may be 
administered, drawing upon a variety of specialists: diviners help with diagnosis, whilst 
witchdoctors help with prevention and treatment, using special positive powers to counteract 
witchcraft related to poor social relations and restore health, or to mitigate causes of foreseen 
ill health. Herbalists will also be consulted if diagnosis indicates a physical or social cause of 
ill health.  
This importance of maintaining the balance and health of both supernatural and 
natural parts of the ethical community has led to an emphasis on cultivating healthy 
relationships, with humans at the centre.  Human relationships, as fundamentally part of an 
integrated whole, can disrupt the necessary balance between various constituents of the 
ethical community, with healthy relationships promoting life and good health and unhealthy 
relationships leading to dis(ease), contrary to life.  Cultivating healthy relationships demands 
adherence to an elaborate ethics system with prescribed and prohibited behaviours, 
                                                     
35 Mbiti J.S. Op cit. Note 17. 
36 Middleton T. and Winter E. (Eds). (1970). Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.  
37 Mokgobi, M.G., (2014). Understanding traditional African healing. African Journal for Physical Health 
Education, Recreation, and Dance. 20 (2), 24. 
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encompassing one’s thoughts, speech, and actions.  For example, specific African 
communities have taboos around speaking about negative realities like mental illness: they 
believe that the very act of vocalising these negative realities could lead to afflicting oneself 
or those closely related with the very same condition.38    
 
iv) Parallel Beliefs in Biomedicine and Traditional Medicine  
African thought and practice contain an important dynamism between divergent 
explanatory and treatment models of illness.  Belief in biomedicine, particularly for certain 
physical illnesses (such as malaria and the common cold) exists alongside the use of 
traditional medicine and appeals to the intervention of supernatural forces.  Biomedicine 
refers to the dominant medical system that is based on Western science39, whilst traditional 
medicine draws on the ‘theories, beliefs, and experiences indigenous to different cultures’ in 
the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of illness40.  Delving deeper, traditional medicine 
views life as interconnected around a concept of bios or life in a more profound sense – 
intimately bound by ‘the context of life [which] takes into consideration a sophisticated cycle 
of systems, all of which are geared toward providing wholeness and wellbeing to a person, a 
people, and their environment.  This is because life, which embodies wellbeing or wholeness, 
has both physical and spiritual dimensions, and extends beyond any physical individual or 
group’.41  Multiple causes of ill health in complex and chronic conditions therefore demand 
multiple approaches to healing.  Many Africans will therefore seek biomedicine alongside 
traditional medicine.  For example, a study on the use of traditional medicine in the 
                                                     
38 By implication, reluctance to speak about mental illness in these contexts presents inherent difficulties in the 
informed consent process, whereby translators would struggle to engage with potential participants to explicitly 
describe the objectives, procedures, and risks of a study as normally expected, let alone describe their 
symptomatology and subjective experience of living with disorder. 
39 Zank S, & N Hanazaki. (2017). The coexistence of traditional medicine and biomedicine: A study with local 
health experts in two Brazilian regions. PLoS ONE 12(4): e0174731 
40 WHO. (2013). WHO Traditional medicine Strategy 2014-2023. Retrieved November 15, 2018, from 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/traditional/definitions/en/  
41 Amenga-Etego. Op cit. Note 15, p. 114. 
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management of HIV and AIDS in western Kenya suggested that a significant number of 
people used antiretroviral therapy and traditional medicine either intermittently or 
simultaneously.42  Likewise, in the case of mental disorder, individuals will seek traditional 
and spiritual forms of healing alongside biomedicine, given that the root of mental illness is 
often attributed to spiritual malfunction while the resultant psychiatric symptoms are 
recognised to respond to psychiatric medications43. 
 
III. Practical Challenges of Translation 
 
Our discussion thus far clarifies how African understandings of disease causation and 
recommended interventions often differ from the Western biomedical framework, largely due 
to certain ontological and ethical commitments embedded in African thought and practice.  
By implication, significant practical and ethical challenges emerge when translation is 
attempted without the necessary prior engagement with the interpretive reality and conceptual 
schemas underlying the African worldview.  Although language embeds an inherent 
communicative function, attempts to communicate across different cultures through 
translation can be severely limited, not least because the worldview expressed within 
language can differ in substantial ways. Language thus promotes certain experiences of 
illness and resultant distress whilst silencing others.44  These challenges play out explicitly in 
the translation of psychiatric genomics research concepts, procedures, and nosology from 
English to local African languages.  Not only do translations of psychiatric genomics terms 
                                                     
42 Kamaara Eunice, Atwoli L., Maithya h., Shitemi N. L., Nduru, G., Braitstein P., Inui T., Ayuo, P., and Folk, 
W.R. (2012). Holistic Healing: The Use of Traditional Medicine and Complementary Alternative Medicine 
(T/CAM) in the Context of HIV/AIDS in Western Kenya. International Journal of Professional Practice. 3(4), 
342-355. 
43Kpobi, L.N., Swartz, L. and Omenyo, C.N. (2019). Traditional herbalists’ methods of treating mental disorders 
in Ghana. Transcultural psychiatry, 56(1), 250-266; Salifu Yendork, J., Kpobi, L. and Sarfo, E.A. (2016). “It’s 
only ‘madness’ that I know”: analysis of how mental illness is conceptualised by congregants of selected 
Charismatic churches in Ghana. Mental Health, Religion & Culture. 19(9), 984-999. 
44 Westermeyer, J., & Janca, A. (1997). Language, culture and psychopathology: conceptual and methodological 
issues. Transcultural Psychiatry, 34(3), 291-311. 
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often risk incoherence to the population they seek to reach, but they also raise difficult ethical 
questions about the legitimacy of informed consent.   
 
 (i) Genetic scientific terminology and research procedures 
English scientific terminology is often difficult to translate to any African language because 
the substantive reality that these words describe either does not exist or is viewed differently.  
For example, none of the indigenous African languages have a word for science or 
technology which references the same semantic field, with all its constitutive epistemological 
assumptions and commitments which render those terms comprehensible in English.  
Rendered in Kiswahili, science and technology is translated into sayansi (science) and 
teknolojia (technology).  Two notable features emerge here: first, English terms have been 
merely ‘indigenised’, making it questionable that basic translation has even taken place.  
Instead, new consonants and vowels have been introduced to the English terms so that the 
words appear like Kiswahili.  Efforts have been made to mimic the English pronunciation, 
suggesting a literal rendering of the original terms rather than an exploration of ways in 
which potential Kiswahili words may capture (however imperfectly) parts of the semantic 
field of science and technology.  Thus, to understand sayansi na teknologia in Kiswahili 
presupposes a prior understanding of the English terms science and technology, essentially 
negating the need for translation.   
Second, the creation of simple, new ‘indigenised’ terms fails as translation because it 
omits the prior and entirely necessary step of substantive engagement with cultural thought 
and practices.45  As a result, the ‘indigenisation’ of terms can ignore ways in which standard 
scientific practices have altogether different meaning and normative significance.  For 
example, the translation of biological samples is rendered in Kiswahili as sampuli za 
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kibiolojia, yet not only would the phrase mean little to someone who is unfamiliar with the 
English phrase, but the very practice of taking bodily substance as samples remains foreign or 
is imbued with deeper cultural significance (such as the use of witchcraft).  Likewise, 
linguistically equivalent African terminology currently does not exist for explaining the 
scientific procedures in psychiatric genomics studies.  These difficulties include very simple 
procedures associated with collecting DNA from saliva (including certain restrictions on 
eating before drawing saliva or the storage of samples), let alone complex procedures (such 
as cell line immortalization and its related risks and benefits).  For example, the purpose of 
extracting DNA from saliva or blood is often explained through translation as isolating the 
unique identifier of one’s person.46  Yet such a translation risks incoherence in a cultural 
context where personhood and the value of one’s identity is bestowed over time through 
social relationships within the ethical community rather than through one’s biological make-
up or genetic heritage. 
One way to overcome the absence of linguistic equivalents is for translators to draw 
from indigenous concepts in order to construct ways of describing these procedures.  Yet 
these innovative descriptions share similar challenges to the ‘indigenisation’ of English 
terms, often misrepresenting the original meanings of concepts. For instance, broad sample 
sharing refers to the sharing of participant DNA with other scientific communities, yet to 
explain the process translators may draw upon normative practices and ethical concepts in the 
African philosophy of Ubuntu which refer to a much more expansive sense of sharing, one 
which emphasises the benefit and empowerment of others more generally. This appeal to 
such normative practices can have a profound effect on consent rates, as seen in a South 
African psychiatric genomics study sampling Xhosa speaking participations from the Eastern 
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and Western Cape provinces.47  Comparing the divergent consent rates between the two 
regions, Campbell et al suggested that participants from the Eastern Cape, typically more 
rural and traditional, may have been more likely to consent to sample sharing and cell line 
immortalization owing to the emphasis on the psychiatric healthcare benefits for later 
generations of the broader Xhosa community in the consent documents.  In contrast to the 
more urban Western Cape, participants within the Eastern Cape may have more strongly 
interpreted this emphasis on sharing within an Ubuntu framework of interconnectedness 
through positive regard and humane and mutual assistance.  This reveals the difficulty in 
determining to what extent this deeper understanding of sharing influences participants’ 
decision to consent to broad sample sharing.  
The use of metaphors is another common approach in describing unknown scientific 
procedures in genomic studies.  According to O’Keefe et al 48 a metaphor is ‘understanding 
and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of the other’. On one hand, metaphors are useful 
in human communication and can enhance affective and cognitive uptake of information; on 
the other hand, they can also misrepresent, oversimplify, or distort relevant information.  
Metaphors may impede communication because to effectively appreciate and interpret a 
metaphor, a target audience needs to have some meta-linguistic awareness.49  In this context, 
meta-linguistic awareness refers to an implicit awareness that language functions also as 
artefact, that is, a reality that often has deeper meaning beyond the symbols or signs.  In other 
words, the general meaning of words is fundamentally refracted through a people’s 
orientation to the world. In many African contexts, the required meta-linguistic awareness 
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around psychiatric genomics may be lacking, and the reality being presented by a metaphor 
does not exist or may not be conceptualized within the people’s worldview.   
A good example of this difficulty would be the metaphor of book for DNA: in the 
comic books Genome Adventure Blast, the authors use the metaphor ‘instruction books’ to 
clarify the meaning of genes, explaining how ‘our traits are determined by special instruction 
books in our bodies called genes.  We look different from each other because our genes are 
different’.50  Other book metaphors include reference to DNA as ‘the book of life’. 51  
Importantly, the metaphor of ‘book’ to an illiterate population is unlikely to make coherent 
sense to the intended audience, given how their daily reality does not include books: what is a 
book and what does it mean?  And even further, what would be the function of an instruction 
book, or indeed, what would the ‘book of life’ refer to?  The normative connotations around 
the metaphor ‘book of life’ are also significant: from some Christian perspectives, this refers 
to God’s records of human moral deeds to be referred to on the day of judgement, recorded in 
both the Old and the New Testament (see for example, Ez. 9:4 & Rev. 3:5).  Instead of 
suggesting gene manipulability, this normative orientation fundamentally would deny the 
notion that the human beings can read, write, and edit the essence of life.  Similarly, the use 
of the term ‘blueprint’ is misleading and prone to misinterpretation in the same vein.  
According to Zwart52, this metaphor suggests that humans are masters of their own design 
and through gene editing, they can determine their destiny.  Although the book or blueprint 
metaphors are meant to clarify and elucidate the meaning of an alien concept, using the same 
metaphors in a different cultural context may in fact obfuscate the meaning further, given the 
                                                     
50 Collaborative African Genomics Network (CafGEN), Genome Adventure Comic, Book 1: Blast to the past: 
Kitso explores heredity and genetics.  Retrieved 22 February, 2019, from 
http://botswanabaylor.org/genome_adventures.html. 
51 Yohan J. John. (2015). If the DNA molecule is the book of life, it’s a very strange book indeed. Retrieved 
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52 Zwart, Hub. (2009). Genomics Metaphors and Genetic Determinism. In Martin Drenthen; Jozef Keulartz & 
James Proctor (Eds.), New Visions of Nature. Complexity and Authenticity. 155-172.  
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absence of the metaphorical referent or corresponding normative orientation in the audience’s 
worldview.   
Hofmann, Solbakk, and Holm53 highlight another instance where a metaphor may be 
confusing: reference to storage of biological samples as ‘bio banking’ elicits transactional 
connotations, suggesting a profit-driven practice which may cause many potential 
participants to withhold consent.  The connotations surrounding the metaphor are 
fundamentally problematic in the African context given the continent’s colonial and neo-
colonial histories of Western exploitation.  Misunderstanding of metaphors can then impede 
effective, and indeed, ethical descriptions of genomic technologies and its processes.54 
 
(ii) Psychiatric nosology and classification 
 
Genomic technologies are not alone in lacking linguistically equivalent terms in 
African languages: the diagnostic classifications of Western psychiatry are also notably 
absent.  Traditional African perspectives and concepts on mental health resist the 
categorisations which persist in Western psychiatric nosology.  Though mental illness may be 
associated with many causes, indigenous African perspectives often view it primarily as the 
manifestation of spiritual dis(ease), that is, the possession by evils spirits55.  This means that 
mental illness is often referred to in the singular, as reference to the loss of mental health, 
directly translated to English as ‘insanity’.  Though technically manifesting one form of 
dis(ease), insanity is considered to be a continuum: in the Bantu language of Gikuyu, for 
example, a person who exhibits mental illness through hyperactivity (in thought, emotions, 
                                                     
53 Hofmann, B., J. H. Solbakk, and S. Holm. (2006). Analogical reasoning in handling emerging technologies: 
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54 Maben, Alex. J. 2016. CRISPR Fantasy: Flaws in Current Metaphors of Gene-Modifying Technology. 
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speech, and action) is called muguruki (mad). At the extreme end of insanity is one who 
exhibits mental impairments through nominal speech and action.  Such a person is said to be 
kirimu (a fool).  Notably, the same term is used to describe persons who have hearing and 
speech impairments.  Translators therefore often use a broad description of thought and 
emotional problems to counter the difficulties associated with psychiatric nosology and 
classification. But these descriptions can mislead participants as to the disorders under 
investigation and the extent to which these refer to their illness experiences.   
 
IV. Ethical Challenge of Informed Consent  
 
When considering all these examples of translation challenges we recognise the deeper 
ethical issues around the validity of consent in psychiatric genomics studies within the 
African context.  As the core foundation of research ethics, informed consent has three 
essential elements: information, comprehension and voluntariness.56  Whether the 
requirements of comprehension and voluntariness are fulfilled becomes questionable when 
the embedded meaning of linguistic terms deviates from the intent of the researchers.  Do 
individuals genuinely understand and ‘freely’ consent if their decision is based on a 
superficial grasp of the procedures and overarching objectives of psychiatric genomics 
research?  Or if their consent is based primarily on the consent forms’ unintended – and 
potentially distortive – resonance with indigenous conceptual and normative frameworks?  
Our discussion thus far highlights deeply problematic questions as to whether alternative – 
potentially misrepresentative – understandings of translated terms qualify as valid consent.  
We propose that these sensitive issues can be addressed by cultivating attenuated forms of 
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translational thinking,57 which should form the basis of any attempts at translation.  Such 
translational thinking describes an ethos towards the interpretation and understanding of 
external conceptual frameworks to oneself and one’s own cultural tradition.  Such thinking 
captures the preparatory work and necessary intellectual conditions prior to obtaining 
consent.  Notably, clinical researchers and IRBs recognise the ethical imperative to avoid 
miscommunication58 but neglect the intellectual orientation and ethical commitment that is 
precisely needed to foster cross-cultural understanding at a deeper level.  Attenuated forms of 
translational thinking develop through the contextual, interpretive engagement with the 
different African conceptual schemas that underlie various practices.  Such necessary 
engagement must precede any efforts at linguistic translation.  This demands Western 
scientific researchers, translators, and bioethicists to critically reflect and situate their own 
conceptual frameworks and attendant values, as well as actively cultivate an intellectual 
orientation of humility, openness, and reciprocity towards alternative conceptual schemas.  
As Kong writes:  
  
The willingness to be challenged and risk our own perspectives, an orientation 
of epistemic humility and openness to the truth contained in frameworks of 
others – are all prerequisites to cultivating this type of translational thinking.  
Such efforts are required to avoid mis-describing the experiences and social 
reality of people within the concerns of alien conceptual schemes as well as to 
challenge the complacency and inertia in our own ways of thinking.59  
 
Such an approach to translation would call into serious question the mere ‘indigenisation’ of 
English terms, or the appeal to indigenous terms in a denuded, decontextualized manner 
                                                     
57 Kong C.  Op. cit.  Note 4. 
58 Faden and Beauchamp (1986); Bromwich an Millum (2015) and (2017). 
59 Kong C.  Op. cit.  Note 4, 107. 
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which fails to properly engage with the common salient features of African thought and 
practice that we have broadly schematised above.   
Without doubt cultivating attenuated forms of translational thinking is a challenging 
intellectual ethos and requires concerted commitment.  It moreover touches on foundational 
issues which we cannot fully explore here, such as the incorporation and validation of 
interpretive meaning as a legitimate scientific form of understanding human behaviour and 
experience,60 as well as the critical evaluation of how cross-cultural comparisons are 
undertaken within the domain of mental health.61   For our purposes, however, an ethos that 
incorporates such attuned translational thinking will have concrete implications in terms of 
how informed consent procedures are developed and applied within psychiatric genomics 
studies in African settings in three ways.  First is the need to attend to the motivational 
question – to understand why individuals consent.  Second, translators and psychiatric 
genomics researchers must acknowledge the possibility of divergent intent, where the 
motives of potential participants may suggest an entirely different normative orientation to 
that of psychiatric genomics research.  Finally, the manner of developing and presenting 
research protocols for institutional ethics boards requires critical re-examination. 
First, informed consent procedures are frequently regarded as an epistemological 
exercise that revolves around the person’s requisite knowledge about the research, to make a 
decision about her participation.  But this narrow focus loses sight of the crucial motivational 
question, where substantive values and commitments – either not referenced to in the consent 
form or evoked through entirely unrelated terminology – may motivate consent or non-
consent.62  Translational issues reveal the intimate connection between comprehension and 
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motivation.  For instance, consider the threshold for comprehending the phrase, sampuli za 
kibiolojia (samples of biology): attempts to explain biological samples as bodily substances 
would elicit deeper metaphysical and normative questions, particularly bound up with the 
issue as to whether ‘biological’ refers to material or nonmaterial substance.  As suggested 
above, these questions are far from trivial: African perspectives attach material, religious, and 
spiritual meanings to blood or saliva which means the taking of these samples would be 
imbued with cultural significance.  In theory, scientific researchers may attempt to narrow 
these meanings, adopting a purely designative approach to language so as to more aptly 
allude to its reductivist connotations in Western settings.  The reality, however, is that 
appeals to reductive definitions refer to a framework of meaning that is fundamentally 
external to the indigenous culture of African participants.  The gain in simple, like-for-like 
translation is a loss in coherent interpretive meaning and understanding for the populations 
such translation seeks to reach.63  As a result, failure or success in obtaining consent are 
misattributed or misunderstood, focusing attention on superficial epistemic knowledge and 
understanding of scientific terms, when the spiritual implications of taking bodily substance 
may be more central to the motivation to participate or not.   
 Second, attending to the motivational question raises the possibility of divergent 
intent: the inherent challenge in translating the relevant terminology in psychiatric genomics 
studies reveals how a people’s normative orientation towards biology, nature, and genetic 
identity may differ in profound ways from the overarching objectives of such scientific 
research.  Acknowledging this possibility may help foster more nuanced approaches to the 
absence of linguistic equivalences.  For example, the concept of genes is absolutely essential 
to genomic studies.  Though the meaning of the term seems self-evident in English, African 
research settings often lack any equivalent word or meaning in local languages.  Researchers 
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therefore often explain the concept to people without basic literacy through reference to 
indigenous concepts of inheritance and ancestry.64  At first glance, this would appear to be an 
effective strategy, given the prevailing importance of family bloodlines and community 
within African thought and practice.  Yet the Western scientific meaning of genes and 
African notion of inheritance reveals a fundamentally divergent normative outlook, thus 
generating further confusion amongst participants: not only does the communal conception of 
bloodlines resist the individualistic connotations of DNA (i.e. that these are unique identifiers 
of one’s biological self), the value-laden meaning of ancestry and bloodlines in the African 
context likewise departs significantly from its reductivist connotations within the scientific 
framework.  The concept of inheritance expresses a normative ethos which prioritises the 
sanctity and givenness of nature whereby that which is gifted by an omniscient being ought 
not to be tampered with – a view strongly at odds with the permissibility of gene alteration 
and manipulation in the Western context.65    
 Third, the ways in which research proposals and informed consent procedures are 
developed to achieve ethics approval demands critical re-examination.  We have intimated 
that the translational problems in psychiatric genomics studies are symptomatic of deeper 
issues around divergent worldviews which resist simplistic like-for-like, designative terms.  
But these problems are amplified by the expectations of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) 
which demand cross-cultural researchers to first develop research proposals and informed 
consent forms in non-indigenous languages (English, French or Portuguese) then translate 
these original documents to the local languages. This approach assumes precisely the 
possibility of like-for-like translation and more worryingly, suggests that such translational 
strategies are ethically warranted.  Yet, as we have suggested here, the ethical justification for 
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this approach is far from clear.  Instead, the presumption of IRBs must be critically 
challenged in order to facilitate much greater nuance in translational efforts, where research 
protocols must be developed first in local languages then translated into the foreign 
languages.  Such an approach aligns well with global mental health thinking around 
culturally-sensitive translations and adaptations of psychiatric assessment instruments and 
mental health interventions.66  An exemplary instance of this in the treatment rather than 
research context is The Friendship Bench project in Zimbabwe, whereby community mental 
health workers utilise their status, connectedness, and intimate knowledge within local 
communities and apply contextually sensitive approach to patients’ distress such as 
kufungisisa (‘thinking too much’) and ‘painful heart’, developing strategies that are often 
‘masked’ to outsiders.67  Adopting similar strategies in the research context, the focus would 
be on engaging with the target community initially, understanding how they understanding 
psychiatric illness and genetic attribution, becoming cognisant of local idioms of distress and 
how these relate to illness experiences, and then developing informed consent materials that 
align more closely with meaning-making frameworks already in place within the community.   
An example helps illustrate our point here.  First, at times, researchers might consider 
using a paragraph, a vignette or a story to translate an English phrase.  For example instead of 
translating the sentence ‘has bipolar’ into ‘ako na bipolar’ one might use two or more 
sentence: “Ako na ugonjwa unaoitwa kwa Kingereza, ‘bipolar’. Hii ni kusema kwamba, huwa 
ana hisi furaha mingi na punde si punde anahisi huzuni mingi. Inakuwa hisia zake 
sinabadilika kutoka furaha mingi au huzuni mingi kwenda huzuni mingi au furaha mingi’ (He 
has the disease called ‘bipolar’ in English.  This is to say, he can feel very happy for some 
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time and in a short while he feels very sad.  His feelings can move from a lot of happiness to 
a lot of sorrow).68  Translation therefore ought to be based on the metaphysical and 
epistemological orientations as well as the intersubjective interpretations expressed by the 
community targeted for research. Whilst the example here illustrate that the challenges of 
translation would not be eliminated, such a process would necessarily integrate a significant 
level of prior community engagement, treating attenuated forms of translational thinking as a 
necessity so that psychiatric genomics researchers begin with an enriched understanding of 
the African worldview, mitigating the dangers of conceptual imposition and in the process, 
enhance validity and reliability of consent.   
Finally, an ethos of attenuated translational thinking raises difficult but fundamental 
questions about psychiatric genomics study design and protocols.  We cannot address it here 
fully but can only gesture towards it as warranting future bioethical exploration.  One 
important aspect of the ethos we are describing is the critical reflexivity of one’s own 
conceptual schema and the cultivation of intellectual reciprocity.  What often prevents more 
nuanced translational thinking is the devaluing and non-integration of more interpretive 
forms of knowledge within the prior development and presentation of scientific protocols – 
something that we think of as remiss if effective translation is to be achieved in the 
consenting process.  Psychiatric genomics studies purport to examine the common genetic 
basis of human thinking and behaviour; yet there is an unavoidable collision of moral, 
epistemological, and ontological visions at play within cross-cultural studies.  In no way are 
we suggesting that such research must cease on the grounds of the divergent conceptual 
                                                     
68 The current requirement by some IRB/RECs to complete Informed Consent templates with word limitations 
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schemas at play between Western and African frameworks, nor that translation is impossible, 
as clearly discussed above.  But often the scientific examination, with its accompanying 
conceptual framework, is taken as truth, without the corresponding humility towards and 
engagement with what African conceptual schemas can contribute to our common knowledge 
and understanding of the phenomena concerned.  Such a stance is unsustainable within the 
ethos we describe above – not simply due to how informed consent procedures may be 
ethically comprised in the process – but because it ignores the potential gain in knowledge 
and understanding that might be obtained through genuine cross-cultural understanding and 
reciprocity.   
 
V. Conclusion  
 
The translation of psychiatric genomics research terminology, research procedures, 
and explanations of psychiatric nosology faces difficult challenges.  Although international 
psychiatric genomics researchers are constructing innovative ways of communicating in 
different cultural contexts, the danger of misrepresenting, oversimplifying and confusing 
relevant information remains nonetheless.  These challenges are particularly acute in 
determining the validity and reliability of informed consent, whereby failure to properly 
engage with specific African linguistic contexts can fundamentally compromise consent 
procedures and potentially mislead individuals when participating in research. 
Addressing the problem of translation requires rejecting the claim that language 
functions purely in a designative fashion, where it is used simply as an instrument to assign 
indigenous terms to scientific facts or things.  Language is a constitutive medium that 
expresses our interpretive understanding, our shared conceptual schemas, values, and way of 
life which help make sense of our different modes of experience.  The language of mental 
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disorder as experience, of genetic identity and inheritance, are therefore enriched with local 
connotations and meanings that vary depending on one’s context.  From this perspective the 
act of translation takes on a very different significance, far deeper than like-for-like 
designative attempts.  Although research protocols of psychiatric genomics studies demand 
some degree of scientific accuracy, we suggest that the problem of translation demands a 
critical reappraisal of what constitutes ethically appropriate and responsible translational 
procedures as warranting ethical approval.  Indeed, rendering scientific studies and its 
protocols first in local languages may be an important, innovative strategy to foster deeper 
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